Paul Heron explores what we have learned so far and what happens next

On 12th March 2015 the then Home Secretary, Theresa May announced the establishment of a statutory public inquiry to examine undercover policing. The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) was set the task of examining all undercover policing in England and Wales since 1968. The reality is that it will concentrate its efforts on the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU). It will also potentially look at some regional police forces.

Unfortunately, it does not have the remit to examine Scotland or Northern Ireland. Lawyers from the Public Interest Law Centre were instructed by activists in Scotland to bring Judicial Review proceedings there, but sadly we could not convince the Scottish High Court that the UCPI should be extended to Scotland.

On 29th June 2023 the UCPI published its Interim Report. The entitled “Undercover Policing Inquiry – Tranche 1 Interim Report” delves into the activities of the SDS and its formation, as well as its operations between 1968 and 1982, (Tranche 1)

The granting of a public inquiry can be attributed to the women activists who were deceived into entering into intimate relationships with undercover officers. Their steadfast commitment to seeking justice forced the Government to authorise a public inquiry. The Stephen Lawrence Family Campaign also applied additional pressure when they discovered that an undercover officer had been deployed to monitor them.

Public order and subversion – no justification

When justifying the activities of the SDS and political policing, two primary arguments have been presented by the legal representatives for the undercover officers (UCOs) and the Metropolitan Police. First, it is argued that the SDS supplied crucial and comprehensive information to avert public disturbances. Secondly, it is contended that the SDS provided essential and detailed intelligence to counteract ‘subversion’ referring to groups and individuals whom the Government alleged sought to overthrow the state.

The Interim Report in its conclusions rejected both of these arguments.

First, the initial findings of the Interim Report clearly indicate that the deployment of UCOs had a negligible impact on the maintenance of public order. In fact, only a tiny portion of the reports (approximately 8% between 1975 and 1978) addressed matters that could be considered relevant to public order. Even in cases where public order issues were involved, the assistance provided was minimal.

Furthermore, the Interim Report establishes that traditional methods of policing could have been employed to achieve what was required. In a damning summary the Report states (p96):

“The question is whether or not the end justified the means set out above. I have come to the firm conclusion that, for a unit of a police force, it did not; and that had the use of these means been publicly known at the time, the SDS would have been brought to a rapid end.”

Secondly, the matter of ‘subversion’ was examined in the Interim Report, which determined that hardly any groups posed a danger to the security or welfare of the State. In other words, they were not subversive. According to the Chair’s perspective, out of the numerous groups that were investigated, only three could be considered as meeting those criteria.

Sexual relationships

The Interim Report has withheld definitive judgments regarding the full impact on women who were deceived into engaging in sexual relationships with UCOs, pending the review of all available evidence. Nevertheless, the testimonies of two women, referred to as “Mary” and “Madeleine,” presented during Tranche 1 were determined to be truthful. In Madeleine’s case, her account was deemed more credible than the conflicting narrative provided by the officer who exploited her. It is noteworthy that the said the officer later assumed the position of director at the National Criminal Intelligence Service.

Political policing

During Tranche 1, the legal team from the Public Interest Law Centre (comprising James Scobie KC; Piers Marquis and Paul Heron)  represented Richard Chessum and Lindsey German. They provided live testimony in person to the Inquiry. They were both political activists during the 1970s. Richard Chessum was active in the Troops Out Movement (TOM) and Lindsey German was then a leading member of the Socialist Workers Party. They were both subject to surveillance and had extensive files opened on them. We have serious concerns that Richard Chessum’s blacklisting resulted from his political activity during this period.

We presented arguments on behalf of our clients, asserting that the MPS, Home Office, and the Security Services (MI5) were fully aware of the illegal practices of the SDS by no later than 1975. The activities were not only sanctioned by the highest levels of the state, but during that period the UCOs were increasingly being directed by MI5. There is little doubt that the state was aware that justifications based on public order and subversion were flimsy at best.

A significant strategy of the SDS was for UCOs to take positions in the organisations that they infiltrated. The Security Services and Senior MPS officers were aware that UCOs – such as Rick Clark – would engage in activity that would inevitably de-stabilise organisations. The state was fully aware of the roles that the UCOs were playing.

As stated, the Interim Report accepts that there was (1) no public order justification and (2) no subversion. The question the UCPI must answer is: Why did the methods and practices of the SDS continue through this period, and indeed, going forward from 1982?

The activists that we represent firmly believe that the sole explanation for the continuation of the SDS lies in a deliberate decision made by top authorities to engage in surveillance, monitoring and infiltration of socialists, anti-racists, and social justice campaigners, driven by political and ideological motivations. We will continue to argue that political policing served as the state’s enduring strategy, aimed at blacklisting individuals and groups, as well as establishing an extensive database of files. No alternative explanations are plausible – particularly given the Inquiry has concluded there are no public order or ‘subversive’ reasons.

Conclusion

The Interim Report is a step in the right direction – but there are major weaknesses.

While the Interim Report acknowledges the misconduct of two undercover officers involved in deceitful sexual exploitation, it fails to address the systemic issues of racism, sexism, and class discrimination within the SDS, which were deeply ingrained. In fact, the report commends the SDS managers, stating that they diligently carried out their responsibilities, believing their actions were legal and in the public’s best interest. This perspective is highly problematic, and we strongly challenge it. The excessive surveillance, the intrusive collection of personal information, the formation of intimate relationships by UCOs, and the devastating impact of vetting and blacklisting on individuals’ lives are all reprehensible and should not be praised.

The Interim Report falls short in addressing the impact of blacklisting and fails to provide any insights on the surveillance of trade unionists and trade unions. We will continue to push these issues on behalf of our clients.

Our clients argue that the reason for the continuation of the SDS for an additional 30 years was its role as an operative arm of the security services and the government, perpetuating a practice of ‘political policing’.

In our closing statement to the UCPI we argued the following, “In their defence, the British establishment claimed to be defending democracy, but it was not a defence of democracy, it was the undermining of democracy in defence of the establishment.” We continue to stand by that.

Paul Heron is the Legal Director and Senior Solicitor at the Public Interest Law Centre. He represents 11 Core Participants at the Spycops Inquiry including former Labour MP Dave Nellist, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Stop the War Coalition.

ONLINE PUBLIC MEETING:

Join Public Interest Law Centre for a free online event on Thursday 20th July as we mark the end of Tranche One of the Undercover Policing Inquiry

As well as releasing a report collating statements we have made to the Inquiry on behalf of the Tranche 1 Core Participants, we will be discussing key findings and what’s next in the Inquiry with:

Donna McLean: Author of Small Town Girl and Core Participant to the Inquiry

Lindsey German: Stop the War Coalition and Core Participant to the Inquiry

Suresh Grover: The Monitoring Group and Core Participant to the Inquiry

Piers Marquis: Doughty Street Chambers

The meeting will take place online over Zoom on Thursday 20th July from 6:30pm.

A Zoom link will be provided closer to the event date (24 hours before).

All welcome except for undercover cops!

Get free tickets here

Event sponsored by the Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers