By Michael Hindley

The end of the Second World War (WW2) saw a dramatic shift in the international balance of power. The end of the First World War (WW1) had seen a carve-up of the old German, Austrian and Turkish Empires, the main European beneficiaries being the emergence of new states of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The fate of the Turkish Empire was a cynical carve-up between France and Britain. The USA stood aside: President Wilson’s  interest in national ‘self-determination’ didn’t stretch beyond Europe, although the disappointed Kurds unsuccessfully bid for an independent Kurdistan on the logical and fair grounds that the Kurds had been suppressed and there were more Kurds than Hungarians.

Britain and France actually expanded their Empires but now into the Middle East. Both imposed on their new clients, Syria, Jordan and Iraq foreign monarchs with no genuine claims to those territories.

This status quo lasted between the world wars but thing changed after WW2, when the USA decided not only to stay in Western Europe, eventually under the umbrella of NATO, but decided to expand its own influence in the Middle East and Asia.

President Roosevelt was openly hostile to European Empires, though he -and more so his successor Harry Truman – were eager to expand the USA’s sphere of influence. The USA always claimed its own expansion was not exploitative but benign, a claim much disputed in Cuba, the Philippines and subsequently in Vietnam. Truman was particularly keen to replace rather than support Britain ‘East of Suez’.

The consensus in the Foreign Office, fully supported by the 1945 Labour government, was to accept the USA’s predominance and play – in the cynical but eloquent expression of Harold Macmillan, the role of “the Greeks in this new Roman Empire of the USA”, and the ‘special relationship’ became a practical reality. Finally, the USA was ready and willing to take up Kipling’s appeal to ‘take up the white man’s burden’, aided by Britain. This make-believe scenario is played out even to this day in many films where the Brits are portrayed as the ‘brains’ behind US power.

This delusion caused a certain collateral damage, for it meant that Britain shunned approaches to join the putative west European alliance which became the EU.

This special relationship received the cold shock of reality with the Suez Crisis of 1956, when Egyptian President Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal. Conspiring secretly with France and Israel, the Tory government launched an ill-fated invasion of Egypt. At first the invasion promised success, but US President Eisenhower pulled the plug by informing Britain that if, as expected, the invasion of Egypt were to cause a run on sterling, then Britain could not expect the US Treasury to bail out the pound. Harold Macmillan, as Chancellor, gave PM Eden the bad news and British troops were withdrawn humiliatingly. This was the turning point: from now on the USA was to be the top dog in the Middle East – not least in Palestine, which between 1923 and 1948 had been a British ‘mandate’.

 If radical Arab nationalism was to be seen off, then it would be dealt with by the USA and increasingly by its surrogate, Israel. Incidentally, it was the Suez disaster that convinced the Foreign Office to have a second and more realistic look at the burgeoning European cooperation leading to the Treaty of Rome.

Britain saw no alternative but to tag along behind Uncle Sam, who was and remains willing to keep up the illusion of a ‘special relationship’ when it suits. There is much to admire in the USA, but not its foreign policy as the world’s gendarme.

And so it has been even under Labour governments. It’s a straight line from Suez to Afghanistan, Iraq and now to Israel/Gaza. British governments will not take one step ahead of the USA on any international issue, but will meekly follow any moves the USA makes. Into and out of Iraq and Afghanistan, British policy is made in Washington DC.

This is why Sunak and Starmer will go along with “humanitarian pauses” not ceasefires, though it is encouraging to see more Labour MPs and Councillors demanding a ceasefire.

It is worth noting that the only exception to this tale of the dog wagging the tail, was when  Labour PM Harold Wilson refused President Johnson’s request for support for the USA war on Vietnam, when LBJ pleaded for just a token force of a Scottish regiment, bagpipes and kilts and all.

But then again, Harold Wilson was more concerned with keeping the broad coalition of the Labour Party together.

The “special relationship” was always a ‘one-way street’ but now has become a ‘cul-de-sac’.

Michael Hindley was a Labour MEP and is now a writer and lecturer on international affairs. Michael can be followed on @HindleyLancs

Image: President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson https://picryl.com/media/president-lyndon-b-johnson-and-prime-minister-harold-wilson-5ad0b8 Creator: Library of Congress | Credit: Library of Congress via Picryl.com Copyright: Public Domain. Licence: PDM 1.0 DEED Public Domain Mark 1.0 Universal